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ESCAPIST TOKEN REPATRIATION APPROACH IN
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION AND THE
WAY AHEAD
RAKIBUL ISLAM BHUIYAN
SAKHAWAT SAJJAT SEJAN
UMME SAYMA AKTER URMI
ABSTRACT
Repatriation is one of the permanent solutions under the UN Refugee Convention
1951. This is also considered as the most desirable solution, as the refugees return to
their country of origin. Unfortunately, the examples of repatriation are rarely heard,
because refugees tend not to leave the host country due to the fear of persecution or
irreparable harm, and the origin countries pose inadvertence to take them back. Lack
of international attention also plays an important role in the implementation of
repatriation in the history of refugee crises. Token repatriation has emerged from this
lack of attention. When the refugee origin state is not willing to take back the refugees,
they take a nominal number of refugees by setting the requirements of documents. This
approach is called token repatriation. The term is less known and discussed, even
though states practice it very often in refuge crises. This article will explore the legal
and political dimensions of token repatriation. It will endeavor to point at the escapist
nature of refugee origin states and token repatriation’s role in it. Lastly, the article will
advocate for rights-based protection approaches rather than adopting token
repatriation to ensure a safe future for refugees, where they will be entitled to dignified
return.
Keywords: Token Repatriation, Dignified Return, Local Settlement, Temporary
Refuge, Internal Relocation
Rakibul Islam Bhuiyan is pursuing BCL at the University of Oxford.
Sakhawat Sajjat Sejan is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Law, University of
Informatio Technology and Science. Email: sejan4645@gmail.com.
Umme Sayma Akter Urmi is an Apprentice Lawyer at the Chittagong Judges' Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As of June 2026, there are 42.5 million refugees worldwide.
1
Although the
repatriation of these refugees to their home countries is a complex legal issue reliant on
the international cooperation and political intent of relevant stakeholders, the concept
of repatriation can be deeply tied to individuals’ personal right to return to one’s country
of origin. Tracing its roots to the Magna Carta of 1215
2
, repatriation has evolved into
various forms throughout the history of mankind, from voluntary returns after World
War II to the emergence of involuntary and conditional repatriation driven by
geopolitical and economic pressures
3
. The first part of the paper attempts to classify the
types of repatriation and delineate the characteristics and examples of each of them.
This part presents the troubling trend reflected by the evolution of repatriation practices,
where coercive or unsafe returns are often justified under humanitarian rhetoric or
geopolitical pressures. Instances of spontaneous, organized, and imposed repatriations
illustrate the diversity of approaches to this issue, with each carrying its own challenges
and limitations.
The second part of the paper discusses the international standards of repatriation
which emphasize the principles of voluntary, safe, and dignified repatriation,
underlining the necessity of ensuring refugees’ informed consent, physical safety, and
access to fundamental rights upon return. Yet, the presence of exemptions in the name
of national emergencies and prevalence of political interference weaken the
effectiveness of these legal safeguards. This part further delves into the principle of
non-refoulement which, being recognized as a jus cogens norm and an obligation erga
omnes, obliges all States to uphold its tenets universally. Token Repatriation often
violates this principle by forcing refugees to return to unsafe or unstable conditions,
thereby breaching obligations under international law.
In contrast, in the third part of the paper the authors introduce the concept of ‘Token
Repatriation’—a term to denote politically motivated and performative repatriation
efforts that emphasizes symbolic repatriation rather than genuine solutions, deviating
1
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Refugee Statistics
<https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/statistics/> accessed 9 June 2026.
2
Ilias Bantekas, ‘Repatriation as a Human Right under International Law and the Case of Bosnia’ (1998)
7 Journal of International Law and Practice 53.
3
B. S. Chimni, ‘From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable
Solutions to Refugee Problems’ (2004) 23(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 55.
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from international legal standards
4
. Such practices prioritize political gains, including
international legitimacy and domestic approval, over the safety, dignity, and
voluntariness of the returnees. The theoretical framework of this paper revolves around
the idea that Token Repatriation often masks deeper political motives, where the well-
being of refugees becomes secondary and a tool of political expediency rather than a
genuine reintegration effort. Through case studies from Rwanda, Somalia, and
Myanmar, the authors show adverse consequences of politically motivated repatriation,
including the violation of refugees’ fundamental rights, increased vulnerabilities upon
return, and the perpetuation of cycles of displacement.
Finally, the fourth part of the paper explores alternative solutions to address the
refugee crisis and prevent the misuse of repatriation practices. Temporary protection
mechanisms, such as local settlement and internal relocation within host States, are
examined as interim measures that uphold refugees’ rights while reducing the reliance
on premature or symbolic repatriation efforts. These approaches, coupled with
strengthened international cooperation and adherence to legal standards, can pave the
way for durable solutions that prioritize human dignity over political expediency. By
providing a detailed critique of existing practices and proposing actionable
recommendations, the paper contributes a vital perspective to the discourse on
international refugee law and durable solutions to the refugee crises worldwide.
II. CLASSIFICATION OF REPATRIATION IN LITERATURE
There is no devised classification of repatriation. Though categorized under
voluntary and involuntary nature of the repatriation, there are some other standards
needed to be contextualized. These standards are found in the works of different
scholars and UNHCR’s handbook.
A. Spontaneous repatriation
Chimni categorized repatriation as spontaneous and organized repatriation.
5
Spontaneous repatriation is an organic approach, where refugees return to their own
country via self-devised initiatives. It takes place in the absence of any international
knowledge, assurance of amnesty, repatriation program or agreement, change of
4
Francesco Morello, ‘Repatriation and Solutions in Stabilisation Contexts’ (2016) 52 Forced Migration
Review 57.
5
B. S. Chimni, ‘The Meaning of Words and the Role of UNHCR in Voluntary Repatriation’ (1993) 5
International Journal of Refugee Law 442.
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government in the country of origin, permission from the host country or end of the
events that triggered the exodus.
6
Although such spontaneous repatriations often benefit
from governmental and UNHCR’s assistance, it is mostly executed with minimum or
no such cooperation. In majority of these cases, the refugees decide they can return
home even without any assistance from international organizations. Spontaneous
repatriation also includes the refugees’ willingness to sustain significant risks for the
purposes of reclaiming their property or reuniting with their families remaining in the
home country. For example, approximately 200,000 Tigrayan refugees returned to
Northern Ethiopia between 1985 to 1987 amidst the civil war.
7
B. Organized repatriation
Organized repatriation requires agreement – an important criterion
8
– to coordinate
with all the concerned parties. Organized repatriation is participatory, where the
insurance of rights of the refugees is an important prerequisite. Without the equitable
participation of government and protection agencies, it cannot be defined as organized
repatriation. In the case of the civil war in Northern Ethiopia mentioned above, a large
number of refugees remained in Sudan until the organized repatriation process
commenced in 1993.
9
C. Safe repatriation
Chimni introduced the notion of ‘safe return’ in 1993
10
and ‘imposed return’ in
1996.
11
He explains how the concept of ‘safe return’ is centered around the safety of
the return in question, rather than the voluntariness of the returnees. This gives birth to
another contention, whether safety of the return or the voluntariness complies with
principle of non-refoulement. Though both the principles are equally necessary, special
emphasis is laid on the safety of the repatriation, because safety will automatically bring
6
G. Coles, Voluntary Repatriation: A Background Study (Paper prepared for the Round Table on
Voluntary Repatriation, UNHCR/IIHL, San Remo, 16–19 July 1985).
7
Barbara Hendrie, ‘The Politics of Repatriation: The Tigrayan Refugee Repatriation 1985–87’ (1991) 4
Journal of Refugee Studies 200.
8
Chimni, above note 5.
9
Laura Hammond, This Place Will Become Home: Refugee Repatriation to Ethiopia (Cornell University
Press, 2004).
10
B. S. Chimni, From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable
Solutions to Refugee Problems (UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No 2, 1999)
<https://www.refworld.org/reference/nirrs/unhcr/1999/en/87406> accessed 9 June 2026.
11
Chimni, above note 3.
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voluntariness among the refugees to return to their own country. Hence, it was
contended that repatriation should not be promoted without ensuring the safe conditions
in the home country.
12
UNHCR reformulated the notion of repatriation by adding
greater emphasis on the safety of the returnees rather than their consent.
13
Supported by
both the UNHCR and the States, this approach has proved to be more practicable and
fruitful compared to the voluntary approach. The repatriation of Rwandan refugees
from Tanzania is a demonstration of ‘safe return’. In December 1996, UNHCR
encouraged the repatriation, advocating that Rwanda was safe for the refugees’ return.
14
In this instance, UNHCR argued that situations in Tanzania were unsustainable for the
Rwandan refugees due to forced mass expulsions, severe land and resource disputes
and political tensions
15
, hence their safety was placed above their voluntariness to
return.
16
The same case has happened with the Rohingyas too. Despite their
voluntariness to return, UNHCR is discouraging repatriation of the refugees in the
absence of safety and dignity in Myanmar.
17
D. Imposed repatriation
Chimni defines this imposition as ‘imposed return’,
18
where the refugees are forced
to leave the host country and return to their country of origin in the less-than ideal
circumstances.
19
Through this, UNHCR recognized the necessity of setting exceptions
to the standards of voluntary repatriation.
20
When host states create hostile, restrictive,
or unsustainable conditions for refugees, repatriation may become the only realistic
option available, despite lack of voluntariness. Chimni explains that the standard of
12
Lauren Stanley, Repatriation as a Controversial Concept: The Case of Somali Refugees in Kenya
(Master’s Thesis, University of Ottawa, 2015).
13
Chimni, above note 5.
14
Ibid.
15
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Land and Natural Resources
Conflicts in the Great Lakes Region of Africa (FAO, 2010)
<https://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/kagera/resource/Land_Natural_Resource_Conflicts.pdf>
accessed 9 June 2026.
16
Katy Long, Back to Where You Once Belonged: A Historical Review of UNHCR Policy and Practice
on Refugee Repatriation (UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, September 2013)
<https://www.unhcr.org/media/back-where-you-once-belonged-historical-review-unhcr-policy-and-
practice-refugee-repatriation> accessed 18 December 2024.
17
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Statement on Voluntary
Repatriation to Myanmar, 22 August 2019 <https://www.unhcr.org/news/news-releases/unhcr-
statement-voluntary-repatriation-myanmar> accessed 10 June 2026.
18
Chimni, above note 10.
19
Chimni, above note 3.
20
Chimni, above note 3.
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voluntary repatriation needed to be ‘contextualized’
21
and liberalized in such cases. One
major example of imposed return is the case of 250,000 Rohingyas who sought refuge
in Bangladesh between 1991 to 2000.
22
In 1994, UNHCR established a target for the
return of approximately 190,000 Rohingya refugees without adequately informing them
of their right to refuse repatriation or providing sufficient information about conditions
in Myanmar.
23
Surveys later revealed that 65% of the refugees were unaware of their
rights and 63% were unwilling to return.
24
As the reasons for their persecution had not
resolved by then,
25
they had to flee once more,
26
resulting in roughly 10,000 new
asylum-seekers at the borders of Bangladesh by May 1996.
27
Imposed repatriation has
some complications, in which refugees’ consent becomes secondary to political,
practical, or strategic considerations, and host states and protection agencies may
prioritize reducing pressure or finding expedient solutions over ensuring genuine
voluntariness
E. Voluntary repatriation
The 1996 UNHCR Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation (hereinafter referred to as
“the Handbook”) establishes the core principles governing voluntary repatriation,
highlighting the link between the voluntary repatriation and the improvement of
circumstances in the home country. It considers such improvements as a prerequisite
for UNHCR’s promotion of voluntary repatriation.
28
The Handbook defines
voluntariness as both the absence of actions which push the refugees to return and the
action of not preventing them from returning.
29
It also recognizes the coordination
between the host country and country of origin for explaining the principle of
21
Chimni, above note 3.
22
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Bangladesh: Analysis of Gaps in the
Protection of Rohingya Refugees, May 2007 <https://www.unhcr.org/media/bangladesh-analysis-gaps-
protection-rohingya-refugees-may-2007> accessed 18 December 2024.
23
Gil Loescher, ‘The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy’ (2001) 35
International Migration Review 33.
24
Médecins Sans Frontières, 10 Years for the Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Past, Present and
Future, 01 March 2002 <http://www.msf.fr/sites/www.msf.fr/files/2002-03-01-Wiggers.pdf> accessed
18 December 2024.
25
Human Rights Watch, The Rohingya Muslims: Ending a Cycle of Exodus?, September 1996
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/b/burma/burma969.pdf> accessed 18 December 2024.
26
Barry N. Stein, Refugee Repatriation, Return, and Refoulement during Conflict (USAID Conference,
October 1997) <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacd092.pdf> accessed 9 June 2026.
27
Human Rights Watch, above note 25.
28
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation:
International Protection (UNHCR, 1996), Chapter 3.1.
29
Ibid, Chapter 2.3.
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voluntariness, i.e., the country of origin inviting the refugees to make informed
decisions on one hand, and the host country allowing their free choice to return.
30
These
are founded on the principle of ‘prevention of harm’, meaning that the refugees feel no
apprehension of harm after returning to their origin country and can lead a life of not
only safety but also dignity in the origin country.
F. Safe and dignified repatriation
Safe and dignified repatriation is no different than safe and dignified return, which
is inserted as a precondition for voluntary repatriation in the Handbook.
31
This process
ensures sustainability of the return of refugees by preventing the apprehension of harm
among them.
32
Return in ‘safety’ has been defined as “return which takes place under
conditions of legal safety […] physical security […] and material security”.
33
Additionally, the Handbook explains that: “The concept of dignity is less self-evident
than that of safety. In practice, elements of dignity must include that refugees are not
manhandled. Additionally, the refugees must return unconditionally and spontaneously
at their own pace. They should not be isolated from their family members and their
rights must be restored with absolute national acceptance.”
34
Though the Handbook came up with voluntary repatriation as a durable solution to
the refugee crisis, different refugee crises have come with different kinds of repatriation
approaches, which may not fit hegemonic definition of voluntary repatriation, making
the execution complex. For example, voluntary repatriation and safe or dignified
repatriation are two opposite approaches. Sometimes, willingness exists, but safety
does not. On the other hand, willingness may be absent while the origin country’s
situation is safe and stable. Hence, the voluntariness and safety of repatriation do not
necessarily coincide and it depends on the refugees’ perception of the situation of the
origin country. This ambiguity has given birth to ‘Token Repatriation’,
35
an escapist
mechanism that endangers the lives of refugees. To examine whether such practices are
30
Ibid.
31
Chimni, above note 3.
32
UNHCR, above note 28.
33
Ibid, Chapter 2.4.
34
Ibid.
35
Arpita Hazarika, ‘Does ICJ Ruling Pave the Way for Rohingya Repatriation?’ Geopolitical Monitor,
25 July 2022 <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/does-icj-ruling-pave-the-way-for-rohingya-
repatriation/> accessed 30 June 2026.
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legally and ethically justified, it is necessary to evaluate the standards governing
repatriation.
III. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF REPATRIATION
A. Voluntary repatriation in international conventions
The right to enter one’s own country is a human right according to the human rights
conventions. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
prohibits its State Parties from arbitrarily depriving anyone of his right to enter his own
country in Article 12(4). The Human Rights Committee observes that Article 12(4) of
the ICCPR does not create any difference between nationals of a State or foreigners,
making the range of the ‘his own country’ wider than ‘country of his nationality’, and
extending the scope of Article 12(4) to persons who cannot be regarded as a mere alien
because of his special ties to or claims relating to the country in question.
36
Thus, this
Article is applicable to citizens, foreigners, or stateless persons.
37
But the Article has a
reservation in Article 4(1) of the ICCPR that permits the State Parties to bypass the
obligation of this right on the grounds of national emergency (threatening the life).
The ‘International Bill of Rights’ does not levy specific obligation on the State
Parties to accept the returning refugees,
38
causing complications due to lack of
codification.
39
However, scholars argue that the right to movement under the UDHR is
reasonably comprehensive, including refugees and stateless persons.
40
Apart from that,
many international conventions protect and guarantee the right to return within their
distinct fields of implementation.
41
For example, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in Article 5 secures racial
and ethnic equality regarding one’s right to return to one’s own country, with General
Recommendation No. 22 affirming the same after the insurance of safe conditions. The
36
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), UN Doc
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (2 November 1999).
37
Vincent Chetail, ‘Introduction: Voluntary Repatriation in Public International Law: Concepts and
Contents’ (2004) 23(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 1.
38
Vic Ullom, ‘Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees and Customary International Law’ (2001) 29 Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy 115.
39
Ibid.
40
Ved Nanda, ‘The Right to Movement and Travel Abroad: Some Observations on the U.N.
Deliberations’ (1971) 1 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 109.
41
Chetail, above note 37.
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principles of non-refoulement and voluntariness must be complied with.
42
Thus,
ensuring safety conditions and voluntariness are reciprocally connected with each
other
43
and the absence of either might invalidate the repatriation.
The prevention of a racial group or groups from the right to return to their country
has been deemed a crime of apartheid, under Article 2(c) of the 1973 Convention on
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. Article 10(1) of Convention
on the Rights of the Child mentions that, State Parties shall deal in an expeditious
manner the applications by a child or his/her parents to enter or leave a State Party for
the reason of family reunification. Article 8 of the 1990 International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
provide in the similar language that migrant workers and their family members shall
enjoy the rights at any time to leave, enter and remain in their State of origin.
Interestingly, all these above-stated conventions are encouraging voluntary repatriation.
Compromise in any of these standards will question the legitimacy of the repatriation,
and may turn it into Token Repatriation if the number of returnees remain low due to
political motives.
B. Voluntary repatriation in regional conventions
Various regional conventions do not mention the term ‘refugee’ in their provisions.
For example, the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
1950 and its subsequent protocol enumerates, ‘no one shall be deprived of the right to
enter the territory of the state of which he is a national.’ The word ‘refugee’ is not
specifically mentioned in either the Convention or any of its Protocols. Moreover,
Article 15(1) of this Convention allows derogation of this right during the times of
emergency. But, ‘emergency’ is not defined in the provision. Similarly, the American
Convention on Human Rights prohibits its State Parties to expel anyone from the
territory of the State of which he is a national or to deprive anyone of the right to enter
it, a right which is derogable during emergency circumstances that threatens the
independence of the State Party as per Article 27(1). The African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights states in its Article 12(2) that “every individual shall have the right
to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”. This Charter also
42
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 22: Article 5
and Refugees and Displaced Persons, UN Doc A/51/18 (24 August 1996).
43
Chetail, above note 37.
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allows restrictions on this right to protect national security, law and order, public health
or morality. These exceptions create complications in the repatriation process.
Another ambiguity regarding the term ‘return’ and ‘enter.’ While voluntary
repatriation means the right to return to one’s own country, none of the Conventions
has focused on the spirit of it by laying emphasis on the word ‘enter.’ It is used to
include the individuals who were born outside their country of origin.
44
Such
individuals cannot ‘return’ to their country of origin, rather, they can enter for the first
time. Scholars have contended that, such a right to ‘enter’ results in the right to
‘return’.
45
They further added that States must guarantee the human rights of refugees
and create a safe environment for the refugees to help them to return to the country they
fled from.
46
Human Rights Committee has agreed with the notion in its General
Comment No. 27 by advising that the right to return is of maximum importance for the
refugees seeking voluntary repatriation.
47
The right to return and voluntary repatriation
are interdependent, and the violation or mere non-recognition of either will inevitably
result in a blow on the other. If the country of origin refuses to recognize refugees' right
to return or implements token repatriation programs driven by political interests rather
than genuine protection, safe and dignified voluntary repatriation becomes
unattainable, rendering the right to return largely ineffective.
The Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (herein after referred as
AALCO) adopted a document that directly requires a State Party to take back its
refugees.
48
Article VI(1) of the Bangkok Principles on Status and Treatment of
Refugees adopted by AALCO specifically mentions that “a refugee shall have the right
to return if he chooses to the State of which he is a national or if he has no nationality,
then the State of which he is a habitual resident and in such an event, it shall be the duty
of such a State to receive him”. Bangkok Principles are important for two reasons: a) it
includes the stateless persons as well the refugees within the periphery of its protection
standard, and b) Article VII(1) of the Principles focuses on the voluntary nature of
repatriation. This provision also requires voluntariness to be ensured before repatriating
44
Ibid.
45
Bill Frelick, ‘Refugee Rights: The New Frontier of Human Rights Protection’ (1998) 4 Buffalo Human
Rights Law Review 261; John Quigley, ‘Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return’ (1998) 39 Harvard
International Law Journal 171.
46
Eric Rosand, ‘The Right to Return under International Law Following Mass Dislocation: The Bosnia
Precedent?’ (1998) 19(4) Michigan Journal of International Law 1091.
47
Human Rights Committee, above note 36.
48
Report of the Asian African Legal Consultative Organization on the Bangkok Principles, UN Doc
A/53/PV.48 (1998).
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the refugees. Article V(1) of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa prioritizes voluntary repatriation over forced return. The
following Article V(3) and V(4) respectively requires states to support the reintegration
of returning refugees by restoring their rights and privileges and encourages countries
of origin to formally invite refugees to return only when conditions are safe, ensuring
they can resume a normal life free from persecution, harassment, or punishment.
Though all instruments seem to be advocating for repatriation, the standards and
processes are not unanimous among them. Anomalies and malpractices are created
from this gap. Token Repatriation is one such anomaly. However, the right to return
should be applicable regardless of the scale of displacement.
49
No text or travaux
préparatoires of the provisions of any human rights conventions differentiate between
the individual and the mass refugees regarding the right to return.
50
The right does not
fluctuate with the number of returning refugees. Unfortunately, Token Repatriation is
availing the advantage and creating this difference. To stop this detrimental mechanism,
the Security Council has consistently emphasized the right of mass refugees to return.
51
However, home countries often misuse the exceptions to this right included in the
instruments to derogate from their responsibility towards the refugees. Home countries
also engage in Token Repatriation by allowing only a disproportionately small number
of returnees, while arguing that repatriation in large numbers will threaten their national
security.
C. Principle of non-refoulement: jus cogens and obligation erga omnes
Principle of non-refoulement has its foundation in article 3 of the Convention
Relating to the International Status of Refugees, 1933. But it was not globally accepted
due to being signed by only nine Member States
52
. Later, this Convention became the
cornerstone of international refugee protection through its incorporation into various
instruments, including the 1951 Refugee Convention, which included the principle of
non-refoulement in Article 33(1). Other conventions followed the 1951 Refugee
49
John Quigley, ‘Mass Displacement and the Individual Right of Return’ (1997) 68 British Yearbook of
International Law 65; Eric Rosand, ‘The Kosovo Crisis: Implications of the Right to Return’ (2000) 18
Berkeley Journal of International Law 229.
50
Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (N. P. Engel,
1993).
51
SC Resolution 1239, UN Doc S/RES/1239 (14 May 1999); SC Resolution 1199, UN Doc S/RES/1199
(23 September 1998).
52
Gilbert Jaeger, ‘On the History of the International Protection of Refugees’ (2001) 83(843)
International Review of the Red Cross 727.
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Convention’s provision of non-refoulement, such as the1969 OAU Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (Article 2(3)), the 1969
American Convention on Human Rights (Article22(8)), 1950 European Convention of
Human Rights (Article 3) and categorically, the 1948 U.N. Convention against Torture
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Article 3).
The principle of non-refoulement has been considered as a part of customary
international law
53
too, both by international
54
and domestic courts.
55
This principle’s
existence in different international and regional human rights instruments has made it
a State practice and an explicit opinio juris which lead to the crystallization of a
customary status.
56
Thus, regardless of being parties to specific Conventions, all States
are bound to provide asylum to the refugees. Apart from that, the States shall not
extradite any individual to a country where there are serious risks to the existence or
welfare of that person.
57
This practice has become a jus cogens or peremptory norm,
first specified in Conclusion No. 25 of the UNHCR Executive Committee 1982. In
1989, non-refoulement was deemed a fundamental prohibition by the UNHCR
Executive Committee
58
and became a non-derogable obligation in 1996.
59
Hence, the
Member States have unanimously accepted the jus cogens status of the principle of non-
refoulement. Its peremptory status is further supported by regional instruments such as
the 1984 Cartagena Declaration and the 2004 Mexico Declaration, as well as
endorsements by bodies including the Organization of American States (OAS) and the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), establish consistent state
practice and broad international acceptance in favour of non-refoulement being a
peremptory norm of international law.
60
53
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1996).
54
Case of Pacheco Tineo Family v Bolivia, Judgment of 25 November 2013, IACtHR, Series C, No 272
[151] (Bolivia).
55
Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU) v Government of Bangladesh and Others
(2017) 20 ALR 17.
56
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and James C. Hathaway, ‘Non-refoulement in a World of Cooperative
Deterrence’ (2015) 53 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 235.
57
Muhammad Alvi Syahrin, ‘The Principle of Non-Refoulement as Jus Cogens: History, Application,
and Exception in International Refugee Law’ (2021) 6(1) Journal of Indonesian Legal Studies 53.
58
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 55 (XL):
General (1989) <https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/578371524.pdf> accessed 9 June
2026.
59
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 79 (XLVII):
General (1996) <https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/578371524.pdf> accessed 9 June
2026.
60
Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime’ (2000) 94
American Journal of International Law 284.
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DOI: 00000 [141]
This notion of jus cogens is also incorporated in article 53 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, meaning that jus cogens norms are non-derogable standards of
international law. This means, as the principle of non-refoulement enjoys the status of
jus cogens, the international community of the States as a whole is required to observe
it.
61
Being a peremptory norm, the principle of non-refoulement prohibiting the return
of any person to another country with considerable reasons for believing that s/he will
be at risk of being subjected to torture is absolute, and it is not subject to derogation
under any circumstance.
62
As such, all the States are prohibited from acting against this
principle.
63
Also, the States should not create, manifest or maneuver any situation,
either directly or indirectly, of de facto or de jure refoulement.
64
This principle is
binding upon all States irrespective of their statuses as parties to the 1951 Convention
or its 1967 Protocol.
The ICJ, in the Nicaragua Case, opined that when inferring the establishment of a
customary rule, the general consistency of the States’ conduct should be sufficient and
any inconsistency of the States’ conduct regarding a given rule should, in general, be
treated as a violation of that rule instead of the acknowledgment of a new rule.
65
So,
any other State’s practice of a new rule or avoidance of principle of non-refoulement
shall be considered a violation of the established principle, State practice or jus cogens.
Thus, the recognition of the principle of non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm
automatically results in a higher threshold of compliance. This threshold is stretched
even further when the principle of non-refoulement, in addition to being a jus cogens
norm, is coupled with the erga omnes obligation.
Erga Omnes has emerged from a clear distinction between the obligations of a State
in relation to another State and the obligations related to the international community
drawn by the ICJ.
66
In the Barcelona Traction Case, the ICJ has defined the concept of
erga omnes and related obligations. It referred the principle as legal interest of all States
in protecting the basic human rights i.e., outlawing the acts of aggression and genocide
61
Lasha Lursmanashvili, The Peremptory Nature of Non-Refoulement Obligation: Juridico-Ethical
Argument for Humanity (Master’s Thesis, Lund University, 2021).
62
Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical Development,
Criteria, Present Status (Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company, 1st ed, 1988).
63
Jean Allain, ‘The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement’ (2001) 13 International Journal of Refugee
Law 533.
64
Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and/or in Need of International
Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, IACtHR, 19 August 2014 [225].
65
Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United
States of America) [1986] ICJ Reports 14 [186].
66
Allain, above note 63.
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and safeguard from slavery and discrimination.
67
It imposes obligation on States to
serve international community. This means, if any obligation is violated by avoiding
the principle which injures the entire international community, the community will take
necessary actions.
68
Any member State of the international community has the locus
standi to enforce an erga omnes obligation regardless of the nationality of the victim of
its violation.
69
By virtue, erga omnes obligations affect the sovereignty of States and their freedom
of consent. After the decision of the Barcelona Traction Case, the international courts
have subsequently developed other erga omnes obligations, including the decision of
the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in the case of Prosecutor v.
Anto Furundžija, whereby prohibition of torture has been recognized as an erga omnes
obligation.
70
Any derogation from the obligation results in a claim for compliance by
all the members of international community. Consequently, the States have the right to
demand the fulfillment of the obligation or in any instance to call for the cessation of
such derogation.
71
If the infliction of torture is linked with the violation of any other
principles of international law, then the erga omnes obligation of prohibiting such
torture will, inevitably, be associated with the related violation in question.
It is argued that, any State can bring an action against another State for breaching a
jus cogens norm, as such norms will concurrently result in an obligation of erga omnes.
Hence all States will have a legal interest following the principle.
72
The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has also opined in favor of such extraterritorial
application of the principle of non-refoulement due to the principle resulting in an erga
omnes obligation.
73
The wider acceptance of the jus cogens and obligation erga omnes
characteristics of the principle of non-refoulement will allow the States to call upon the
obligations of other States committing the potential human rights violations by
derogating from the non-refoulement principle.
67
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Reports 3 [34].
68
Ibid.
69
Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press, 2001).
70
Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija, ICTY Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998,
[151].
71
Ibid.
72
International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Seventy-First Session, UN Doc A/74/10 (2019).
73
The Institution of Asylum and its Recognition as a Human Right in the Inter-American System of
Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-25/18, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 30 May 2018 [181].
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The jus cogens non-refoulement obligation is considered as a notion of material
law, and the erga omnes obligation associated with it is referred as a means to confer
this binding obligation upon States.
74
The lack of voluntary repatriation is a subject of
collective interest of the international community. Hence, the protection of these
refugees is a concern of all the States of the international community.
75
The breach of
an erga omnes obligation results in the violation of this collective interest. In such a
case, any member can invoke an action on behalf of the international community.
76
The
refugee crisis frequently involves genocide, racial discrimination, torture and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatments, protections from which are obligations erga omnes.
77
Consequently, the international community also has the obligation to uphold the
principle of non-refoulement. Accordingly, a breach of this principle constitutes a
violation of an erga omnes obligation, entitling any State to invoke the international
responsibility of the offending state,
78
regardless of whether it is directly affected.
More precisely, a State’s implementation of Token Repatriation consequently
violates the principle of non-refoulement as it prioritizes the State’s own political
objectives over refugees' consent, safety, and dignity, haphazardly repatriating a small
number of refugees as a deception to the international community without ensuring that
conditions in the country of origin are safe. This further exposes returnees to
persecution, discrimination or torture, thus violating the principle of non-refoulement.
In such a case, the principle of non-refoulement and its jus cogens and erga omnes
characters act as safeguarding measures against the façade of Token Repatriation.
However, despite these robust legal protections, repatriation practices continue to
evolve in ways that formally appear lawful while substantively undermining refugee
protection. This phenomenon is conceptualized in this paper’s following section as
‘Token Repatriation.’
74
Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind (Brill | Nijhoff, 2020).
75
Maarten den Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (Bloomsbury, 2011).
76
Beyza Özturanlı and Nasıh Sarp Ergüven, ‘A Consideration on Legality of Border Barriers: The
Principle of Non-Refoulement and Its Extra-Territorial Effect’ (2020) 68(4) Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk
Fakültesi Dergisi 893.
77
Case of Soering v the United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, European Court of Human Rights,
7 July 1989 [88]; Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and/or in Need of
International Protection, above note 64.
78
Devershi Mishra and Komal Khare, ‘Responsibility of the First World Nations to Protect Refugees:
Non-Refoulement as an Obligation Erga Omnes’ LSE Human Rights Blog, 23 January 2017
<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/humanrights/2017/01/23/responsibility-of-the-first-world-nations-to-protect-
refugees-non-refoulement-as-an-obligation-erga-omnes/> accessed 9 June 2026.
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IV. ‘TOKEN REPATRIATION’: A NEW IDEA WITHIN A PERSISTENT
PHENOMENON
A critical overview of literature crystallizes the existing forms of repatriation but
not comprehensively examine the situation of the country of origin or the motive of
country of origin while repatriating. While coordination from the home country is
evident in the most organized repatriation events,
79
the political motive of the home
country government to facilitate such repatriation is often overlooked. Hammond,
Black and Koser argued that due to refugees becoming a highly politicized symbol
80
, a
symbol used to influence international bodies and audiences, the intentions of the
stakeholders, including those of the home governments’, require to be scrutinized.
81
Token repatriation too emerges from political signaling to shape international
perceptions than as a genuine indicator that the conditions for large scale voluntary
repatriation has been achieved. Unfortunately, intention is not included as a standard
before executing repatriation. Such action is often performative, intended only to gain
political support or legitimize governmental actions. The authors of this paper propose
to define such a performative approach as ‘Token Repatriation.’ This refers to a
deliberate facilitation of a limited number of refugee returns primarily to create the
appearance of progress while leaving the structural causes of displacement unresolved
and failing to ensure that returns are voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable.
Conceptually, token repatriation comprises several interrelated elements,
a) limited or selective returns,
b) the absence of conditions for safe and dignified return,
c) disproportionate publicity or diplomatic emphasis on the return process,
d) the strategic political use of those returns to signal compliance or progress.
These elements together demonstrate that the political and symbolic value of
repatriation outnumbers its humanitarian purposes thereby establishing the concept of
token repatriation. Moreover, in some cases, governments also use the returnees as
political pawns to gain support for the post-conflict political party.
82
The number of the
refugees to be repatriated is usually lower compared to regular repatriation because
79
Chimni, above note 5.
80
Laura Hammond, ‘“Voluntary” Repatriation and Reintegration’ in Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil
Loescher, Katy Long and Nando Sigona (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration
Studies (Oxford University Press, 2014) at 491.
81
Richard Black and Khalid Koser, The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and
Reconstruction (Berghahn Books, 1999).
82
Hammond, above note 80.
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these countries often ask for certain documents generally unavailable to the mass
refugees as a prerequisite for repatriation. These cases are prevalent in the refugee
protection practices with or without a name. Here are examples and assessments of
some of the major repatriation procedures below to find out the existence of Token
Repatriation throughout history:
A. Case study: Rwanda
After Rwandan genocide during the civil war fin 1994, the Rwandan government
used repatriation as a political strategy to take back the refugees,
83
despite continuing
enforced disappearances and killings
84
as well as lack of fair trials and basic living
conditions
85
– circumstances under which the UNHCR Handbook on Voluntary
Repatriation did not recommend return
86
. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the then
post-conflict government, encouraged the repatriation of the Rwandan refugees by
portraying Rwanda as safe for repatriation and such repatriation as imperative for
rebuilding the nation and attaining legitimacy for the new government.
87
The RPF
government's political motives were reflected in its coercive pressure on refugees –
often supported by UNHCR as the least catastrophic option available – by portraying
them as a threat to regional stability and requiring them to leave refugee camps. Nation
building was forwarded as a pseudo reason to cover up the matter of legitimacy for the
government. Programs like ‘I am Rwandan’ was introduced in that process and
alternative narratives were labelled as divisionist.
88
This has extended in the cases of
refugee repatriation too. The government even blamed the non-returning refugees for
participating in the genocide and avoiding accountability for their deeds.
89
Since the
conditions in post-conflict Rwanda were not safe for repatriation, the establishment of
83
Frank Ahimbisibwe, ‘The Politics of Repatriation: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda, 2003–2017’ (2017)
IOB Working Paper No 2017.09, University of Antwerp <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.29822.28481>
accessed 9 June 2026.
84
Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: Disappearances Require Credible Investigations, 15 August 2019
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/15/rwanda-disappearances-require-credible-investigations>
accessed 6 July 2026.
85
James C. Hathaway, ‘Why Refugee Law Still Matters’ (2007) 8 Melbourne Journal of International
Law 89.
86
UNHCR, above note 28.
87
Beth Elise Whitaker, ‘Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection: The Rwandan Repatriation from
Tanzania’ (2002) Department of Political Science, George Washington University Working Paper No 53
<https://www.unhcr.org/in/sites/en-in/files/legacy-pdf/3c7528ea4.pdf> accessed 9 June 2026.
88
Lindiwe D. Makhunga, ‘Post-Genocide Rwanda and Discursive Construction of Legitimacy:
Contesting Seemingly Dichotomous Political Narratives’ (2019) 45(3) Social Dynamics 382.
89
Long, above note 16.
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community-based Gacaca court system to execute genocide suspects, land disputes,
lack of independence of judiciary
90
and hence, the refugees did not return by themselves
before being coerced to do so
91
. As such, the voluntariness of their return is
questionable. The government’s approach towards the refugees is enough to
comprehend the fear in the minds of the returnees and their unwillingness to return.
92
B. Case study: Somalia
Following decades of civil war, more than 700,000 Somali refugees are living in
neighboring States.
93
President Hassan Sheikh's government promoted refugee
repatriation to project political stability
94
and attract international funding.
95
Although
UNHCR asserted that Somalia’s conditions were not yet suitable for large-scale
repatriation,
96
Somali government’s promotion of refugee fuelled by political
objectives cast doubts on the voluntariness of repatriation due to pressures on refugees
in Kenya, such as threats of camp closures and reduced protection, which limited their
ability to make a free and informed choice. This is Token Repatriation, where small-
scale returns were used to gain international legitimacy and donor support.
C. Case study: Myanmar
Myanmar government’s initiative is the most recent example of Token Repatriation.
As of now, more than 1.3 million Rohingyas are living in the neighboring countries,
where Bangladesh alone has given refuge to approximately 1.0 million Rohingya
refugees.
97
Following China’s mediation, Bangladesh and Myanmar will be entering a
90
IRIN, ‘Rwanda–Uganda: Refugees Unwilling to Return’ ReliefWeb, 27 April 2009
<https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/rwanda-uganda-refugees-unwilling-return>
accessed 6 July 2026.
91
Whitaker, above note 87.
92
Naoko Hashimoto, ‘Post-Genocide Rwandan Refugees: Why They Refuse to Return “Home”: Myths
and Realities. By Masako Yonekawa. Springer, 2020, pp. 136’ (2021) 37(2) Refuge: Canada’s Journal
on Refugees 167, at 168.
93
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Somalia Refugee Crisis Explained, 17
July 2023 <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/somalia-refugee-crisis-explained/> accessed 9 June 2026.
94
Tom Maruko, ‘Briefing: Repatriating Somali Refugees from Kenya’ IRIN, 13 November 2013
<https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/briefing-repatriating-somali-refugees-kenya> accessed 9 June 2026.
95
Stanley, above note 12.
96
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘First Somali Refugees in Kenya Decide to Return
Home as Part of a New Pilot Project ’ (Press Release, 8 December 2014)
<https://www.unhcr.org/news/news-releases/first-somali-refugees-kenya-decide-return-home-part-
new-pilot-project> accessed 9 June 2026.
97
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Myanmar Situation
<https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/myanmar> accessed 9 June 2026.
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bilateral agreement to execute repatriation of the Rohingyas refugees.
98
However, the
UNHCR suggests that the situation of Northern Rakhine is in no way suitable for
repatriation.
99
It will ensure neither safe and dignified return nor a peaceful life for the
returnees. Despite the announcement of a ceasefire in November 2022
100
, the returnees
face a high risk of death or serious injury by landmines in Rakhine State.
101
In Conclusion No. 40 (XXXVI) adopted in 1985, UNHCR emphasized that
repatriation should take place under absolute safety and return to the original place of
residence of the returnees in their home country should always be respected. During the
outrage in 2017, more than 400 Rohingya villages were allegedly destroyed
102
and
cleared to build military or government infrastructure before the military coup in
2021.
103
Myanmar authorities failed to guarantee the return of the Rohingyas to their
original homestead.
104
Now the question is, can it be called a safe and dignified
repatriation? Returning refugees to unspecified or relocation/transit camps cannot be
repatriation. The extensive demolition of Rohingya communities and residences makes
it nearly impossible for them to be able to return to their location of choice.
UNHCR in Conclusion No. 18 (XXXI) of 1980 stresses on the voluntary nature of
the repatriation. The standards include, a) the returnees shall not be punished for leaving
the state of origin, and b) concerned governments shall ensure restoration of their
nationality if required.
105
On the contrary, Rohingya refugees attempting return to
98
‘China Mediating Between Bangladesh, Myanmar’, The Daily Star, 6 May 2023
<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/diplomacy/news/china-mediating-between-bangladesh-
myanmar-3312436> accessed 6 July 2026.
99
‘UNHCR: Rakhine Not Safe for Myanmar’s Rohingya Repatriation Pilot Project’ BenarNews, 15
March 2023 < https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/bengali/rohingya-repatriation-pilot-
03152023144159.html> accessed 9 June 2026.
100
‘Myanmar Military, Arakan Army Halt Hostilities on Humanitarian Grounds’ Radio Free Asia, 28
November 2022 < https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/ceasefire-11282022182711.html>
accessed 9 June 2026.
101
‘Landmine Casualties Mount in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ Radio Free Asia, 22 February 2023
<https://www.rfa.org/english/video?v=1_4lie81b9> accessed 9 June 2026.
102
Tasneem Tayeb, ‘Rohingya Repatriation: Easier Said Than Done’ The Daily Star (Dhaka, 9 August
2023) < https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/rohingya-repatriation-easier-said-done-
3389896> accessed 9 June 2026.
103
Jonathan Head, ‘Rohingya Crisis: Villages Destroyed for Government Facilities’ BBC News, 10
September 2019 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49596113> accessed 9 June 2026.
104
BenarNews, above note 99.
105
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 18 (XXXI):
Voluntary Repatriation (1980).
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Myanmar has been imprisoned
106
and Myanmar’s citizenship law of 1982 is
unfavorable to the citizenship of Rohingyas.
107
As such, they have become stateless.
Another concerning aspect of the pilot repatriation project is the disproportionate
and inconsistent number of proposed returnees. In 2019, only 3,540 of 22,000 Rohingya
recommended for repatriation by Bangladesh got clearance from Myanmar.
108
In 2023,
Myanmar planned the repatriation of only 1140 refugees, while 711 of them got their
clearances.
109
This meager number raises doubt regarding Myanmar government’s
willingness to repatriate the refugees in a safe and protected environment. Given the
unsuitability and instability in Rakhine State, Myanmar’s actions raise questions and
concerns. This also leads us to a conclusion, where we find gaining political legitimacy
and international support as reasons. For the postponed election
110
, the Military junta is
pressurizing the UN for the repatriation of the refugees despite the safety concerns
111
to show that it will be free and fair. The initiative is also influenced by China's interest
in stabilizing Rakhine State to advance projects under the China–Myanmar Economic
Corridor.
112
This Token Repatriation is intended, to pacify the international community
and, allegedly, to eyewash the ICJ's probe of accusations against the military forces
113
.
From the discussion on the above case studies of Rwanda, Somalia, and Myanmar,
it is clear that countries have initiated Token Repatriation multiple times throughout
106
Eleanor Albert and Lindsay Maizland, ‘The Rohingya Crisis’ Council on Foreign Relations, 23
January 2020 <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis> accessed 9 June 2026.
107
Iftekharul Bashar, ‘Impact of the Rohingya Crisis on the Threat Landscape at the Myanmar–
Bangladesh Border’ in Christian Echle (ed), Combatting Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Asia and
Europe: From Cooperation to Collaboration (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, 2018) 29.
108
‘Rohingya Repatriation: First Batch to Return Aug 22’ The Daily Star (Dhaka, Bangladesh) 16
August 2019 <https://www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-crisis/news/rohingya-repatriation-first-batch-
return-aug-22-1785979> accessed 9 June 2026.
109
Ruma Paul, ‘Myanmar Team in Bangladesh Camps for Rohingya Repatriation Pilot Project’ Sight
Magazine (Dhaka, Bangladesh) 15 March 2023 <https://www.sightmagazine.com.au/news/myanmar-
team-in-bangladesh-camps-for-rohingya-repatriation-pilot-project/> accessed 9 June 2026.
110
‘Myanmar Military Extends Emergency, Postpones Election’ Al Jazeera, 1 August 2023
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/1/myanmar-military-extends-emergency-postpones-election>
accessed 9 June 2026.
111
Sebastian Strangio, ‘UN Participating in Pilot Rohingya Repatriation Project, Despite Safety
Concerns’ The Diplomat, 20 March 2023 <https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/un-participating-in-pilot-
rohingya-repatriation-project-despite-safety-concerns/> accessed 9 June 2026.
112
Sebastian Strangio, ‘Myanmar, Bangladesh Readying Repatriation of More Than 1,000 Rohingya’
The Diplomat, 16 March 2023 <https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/myanmar-bangladesh-readying-
repatriation-of-more-than-1000-rohingya/> accessed 9 June 2026.
113
Sakhawat Sajjat Sejan, ‘Questioning the “Token Repatriation” of the Rohingyas’ The Daily Star, 28
April 2023 <https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/questioning-the-token-repatriation-the-
rohingyas-3306226> accessed 9 June 2026.
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history. From the trends of these countries, the following elements of Token
Repatriation can be established:
a) Returnees’ willingness, voluntariness and well-being remain unconsidered,
b) Their citizenship, residential status and access to basic rights is compromised or
disputed,
c) The repatriation initiatives are politically and economically motivated,
d) The repatriation initiatives are executed to gain national acceptance and reduce
international pressure,
e) The number of returnees is disproportionately low compared to the number of
refugees in the host countries,
f) Irregular frequency of the repatriation phases, and
g) Facilitation of repatriation without considering home countries’ unsuitable and
unsafe conditions.
The presence of any one or more of the above-mentioned elements will indicate the
initiation of a Token Repatriation, which will violate the international standards of
repatriation based on the principles of international law.
V. CONDEMNING THE TOKEN REPATRIATION APPROACH AND BRINGING
OUT BETTER TEMPORARY PROTECTION APPROACHES
The Token Repatriation – a political symbol to avoid pressure from the international
community – is a threat towards safe and dignified repatriation as it will disrupt and
divert the future repatriation approaches. For example, only about 1000 Rohingyas were
able to submit the requisite documents for repartiration to the Myanmar authority,
114
allowing Myanmar to show token returns to deceive the international community with
the belief that Rohingyas will be repatriated. However, in reality, the remaining
Rohingyas will never be repatriated due to the complexities of legal requirements.
Bangladesh needs to find answers to a lot of questions to resolve the Rohingya
crisis. While voluntary repatriation remains the preferred option, Bangladesh should
continue pursuing it through diplomatic negotiations and international advocacy. If
Bangladesh is unable to send them back, the government might consider providing
temporary status to the Rohingyas following the doctrine of temporary refuge of
UNHCR, bringing them under the roof of rule of law and legal protection. The
114
Diplomatic Correspondent, ‘Rohingyas in Bangladesh: Myanmar Proposes Taking Them Back’ The
Daily Star, 3 October 2017 <https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/mayanmar-refugee-crisis-myanmar-
take-back-rohingyas-1470688> accessed 9 June 2026.
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government might also choose to settle the Rohingya refugees through local settlement,
which will encourage the spirit of repatriation among them.
A. Local settlement
Local settlement is a temporary protection mechanism.
115
Through this, the refugees
are sent to a particular place in the host country with limited education and employment
facilities. Local settlement may be pursued in three ways, i.e. spontaneous settlement,
state-sponsored settlement and agricultural settlement.
116
In spontaneous settlement,
refugees are given the chance to choose the place and process of their settlement, and
may even avail livelihood opportunities, education and medical facilities. State-
sponsored local settlement is done by the States, whereby host States designate and
place and mechanism for the refugees. For example, some of the Rohingya refugees in
Bangladesh were sent to State-sponsored settlements in Bhasan Char.
117
In the case of
agricultural settlement, refugees are given agricultural land. They cultivate different
types of vegetables and other grains to support themselves. To accelerate the
repatriation approach, a blended settlement mechanism might be adopted by the host
States, where the refugees will be locally settled by the State through their spontaneous
choices and with cultivating facilities. Through this approach, they will become self-
sufficient and self-reliant during their stay in the host country.
B. Temporary refuge
Temporary refuge is another approach of refugee protection. It is a principle of
international refugee law and UNHCR.
118
In 2001, the European Union (EU) adopted
a directive named Temporary Protection Directive that follows this principle.
119
Temporary protection provides refuge in the European region for a period of 1 to 3
115
Sakhawat Sajjat Sejan, ‘Internal Relocation Alternative: An Aid to Principle of Non-Refoulement
and Local Settlement’ (2023) 8(1) Wolverhampton Law Journal 24.
116
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Settlement Typologies in Emergencies,
1 February 2004 < https://emergency.unhcr.org/emergency-assistance/shelter-camp-and-
settlement/settlements/settlement-typologies-emergencies> accessed 9 June 2026.
117
Human Rights Watch, “An Island Jail in the Middle of the Sea”: Bangladesh’s Relocation of
Rohingya Refugees to Bhasan Char, 7 June 2021 <https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/06/07/island-jail-
middle-sea/bangladeshs-relocation-rohingya-refugees-bhasan-char> accessed 21 July 2026.
118
Maciej Grześkowiak, ‘Empirical Consequences of Normative Inadequacies: The Principle of
Temporary Refuge and Protection Gaps’ (2023) 25 Journal of International Migration and Integration
573.
119
Esin Küçük, ‘Temporary Protection Directive: Testing New Frontiers?’ (2023) 25(1) European
Journal of Migration and Law 1.
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years and by this time, refugees go through the process of empowerment.
120
After
getting empowered, refugees work to support themselves without any significant
cooperation from the host State. To activate the Temporary Protection Directive, some
standards might be set as follows
121
: a) the person might come from an armed conflict
area, b) the person is unable to return to his country of origin due to such armed conflict,
and c) the person has to stay within the borders of the EU or the host country. Persons
fulfilling these standards will avail protection from the protecting region or the state.
States may consider adopting the Temporary Protection Directive or the principle of
temporary refuge to give protection to the refugees.
C. Local solution
Local solution is defined in paragraph 100 of the Global Compact on Refugees
2018.
122
It is considered as interim legal stay in the refugee host country and an
arrangement to facilitate and complement the durable solutions. It is pursued with two
goals, to enforce access to rights and to accelerate the process of durable solutions.
Local solution does not attach any further obligation to the existing responsibilities of
the refugee host countries, focusing on the fulfilment of state responsibilities towards
refugees. It will further strengthen the execution of durable solutions through economic
and fiscal pursuits, where the refugees will enjoy the right to decent work, employment,
housing, basic education, social protection and medical facilities.
123
To make the
refugees self-reliant, there are no other ways except giving them the independence from
refugee camps. It will work as an alternative to refugee camps and reduce irregular
refugee movements in a refugee host country. The core focus of local solution remains
at the right-based approach of protection. Safeguard from refoulement, seeking asylum,
and documented legal protection will automatically be provided through local solution.
120
Katrien Luyten, ‘Temporary Protection Directive’ European Parliamentary Research Service, 2022
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729331/EPRS_BRI(2022)729331_EN.p
df> accessed 9 June 2026.
121
Meltem İneli Ciger, ‘Reasons for the Activation of the Temporary Protection Directive in 2022: A
Tale of Double Standards’ ASILE Global Portal, 6 October 2022 <https://www.asileproject.eu/reasons-
for-the-activation-of-the-temporary-protection-directive-in-2022-a-tale-of-double-standards/> accessed
9 June 2026.
122
International Council of Voluntary Agencies, Local Solutions for Refugees: Key Considerations,
2021 <https://www.icvanetwork.org/uploads/2021/12/ICVA-UNHCR-Local-Solutions-Paper.pdf>
accessed 9 June 2026.
123
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Local Integration and Other Local
Solutions, 2024 <https://reporting.unhcr.org/global-appeal-2025/outcome-areas/local-integration-and-
other-local-solutions> accessed on 9 June 2026.
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D. Internal Relocation Alternatives (IRA) in host States
Internal relocation/flight/protection alternative is a mechanism of refugee status
determination under the 1951 Refugee Convention.
124
This practice examines whether
asylum seekers exhausted all their protection, flight or relocation alternative in their
origin country before moving into the refugee host country.
125
If all alternatives have
been exhausted, the individual will be recognized as a refugee or granted protection in
the host country. Otherwise, the IRA will serve as a protection mechanism without
affecting refugee status determination, while relocation outside camps will promote
refugees' integration into the host community. There are two fundamental tests to
examine the practicality of IRA
126
One is the relevance test, which scrutinizes whether
the relocation place is safe and legally accessible and the asylum seekers will not have
to face serious harm due to such relocation.
127
The other is reasonableness test, which
seeks whether the asylum seekers will lead a comparatively normal and better life in
the relocated place.
128
The proposed temporary measures are useful for managing immediate refugee
influxes but cannot replace the durable solutions recognized under the 1951 Refugee
Convention
129
, particularly voluntary repatriation. Only permanent solutions will
restore their normal life and all the fundamental rights as a human being. Token
repatriation will hinder permanent repatriation and create an environment of insecurity
in the host country while discouraging internal relocation or integration. That is why,
this paper discourages Token Repatriation and advises to pursue other durable
solutions. To avoid such practice, States may adopt suggested temporary solutions and
accelerate the execution of durable permanent solutions.
124
James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, ‘Internal Protection/Relocation/Flight Alternative as an
Aspect of Refugee Status Determination’ in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds),
Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection
(Cambridge University Press, 2003) 357.
125
Pia Zambelli, ‘Internal Flight Anarchy: Points of Divergence from UNHCR Guidelines in Canadian
Decision Making’ (2024) 36(3) International Journal of Refugee Law 248.
126
Sakhawat Sajjat Sejan, ‘The Dynamics of Rohingya Relocation under “Internal Relocation
Alternative”’ The Daily Star, 29 December 2020 <https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/the-
dynamics-rohingya-relocation-under-internal-relocation-alternative-2018961> accessed 9 June 2026.
127
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on International Protection:
“Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative” within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention
and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/03/04, 23 July 2003.
128
Ibid.
129
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Finding Durable Solutions for Refugees
<https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/61a0fe634.pdf> accessed 9 June 2026.
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However, effectiveness of these approaches depends on structured incentives,
burden sharing mechanisms and legal safeguards that align host state’s interests with
refugee protection. The feasibility of these alternatives must be assessed within the host
state’s incentive structure rather than presumed goodwill. A state that views refugees
as an ‘excessive burden’ is unlikely to prioritize integration unless external pressure,
funding, or binding legal obligations make such options economically and politically
viable. In this context, local settlement, internal relocation and other hybrid solutions
operate less as voluntary humanitarian choices and more as negotiated outcomes shaped
by international burden-sharing and strategic interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
The practice of Token Repatriation portrays a stark departure from the fundamental
principles of refugee protection enshrined in international law. It weakens the
credibility of international human rights frameworks and perpetuates cycles of
displacement and vulnerability. The case studies of Rwanda, Somalia, and Myanmar
provide evidence of how such practices disregard the principles of voluntariness, safety,
and dignity, resulting in devastating consequences for returnees and their communities.
To counter Token Repatriation, international legal standards requiring voluntary, safe,
and dignified repatriation must be strictly upheld, with non-refoulement recognized as
a jus cogens norm and erga omnes obligations by states. Furthermore, alternative
protection mechanisms – such as local settlement, temporary refuge, and internal
relocation – should be implemented to alleviate the immediate pressures faced by host
States while ensuring the well-being of refugees which can serve as stepping stones
toward durable solutions, including voluntary repatriation.
However, these alternatives are inherently dependent on abstract political goodwill
and alignment with host-state interests. Even in highly politicized refugee contexts,
where states may initially frame refugees as a burden, local settlement, temporary
refuge, and internal relocation can function effectively when embedded within a
coordinated policy architecture. This includes predictable international burden-sharing
arrangements, targeted development financing to host regions, and conditional
assistance frameworks that reward compliance with protection standards while
offsetting perceived socio-economic costs. Furthermore, institutionalized monitoring
mechanisms under international and regional frameworks can ensure that these
solutions are implemented as managed and enforceable processes rather than
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discretionary political choices. In this way, the alternatives proposed are not defunct
ideals, but operational policy tools capable of overcoming political resistance by
transforming refugee management into a structured regime of shared responsibility and
measurable incentives.
Moreover, addressing the root causes of forced displacement remains critical to
resolving the global refugee crisis. Efforts to promote peace, stability, and inclusive
governance in home countries must be prioritized to create conditions conducive to safe
and sustainable returns. International organizations, including the UNHCR, must play
a proactive role in monitoring and advocating for adherence to repatriation standards
while holding States accountable for violations. Token Repatriation poses significant
risks to refugee protection and the rights of displaced individuals. By exposing the
shortcomings of this practice and advocating for genuine solutions, this paper aims to
contribute to a more just and humane approach to resolving the refugee crisis. A
collective commitment to upholding international legal standards, coupled with
inclusive strategies, can pave the way for a future where refugees are not merely
numbers in a political calculus but individuals with rights and dignity deserving of
protection and respect.
DECLARATION
The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interests regarding the publication
of this manuscript.
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